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The paper studies the determinants of international differences in household indebtedness, and inquires whether 
indebtedness is associated with increased “financial fragility”, as measured by the sensitivity of household arrears and 
insolvencies to macroeconomic shocks. It also investigates whether financial fragility is affected by institutional factors, such 
as information sharing arrangements, judicial efficiency and individual bankruptcy regulation. We address these issues by 
tapping three data sets: (i) cross-country data on household indebtedness; (ii) European panel data for households lending 
and arrears; and (iii) time series data for household lending and insolvencies in the U.K., the U.S.A. and Germany. Overall, 
the analysis underscores the importance of institutional arrangements in determining the size and fragility of household credit 
markets. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Research on credit markets typically focuses on lending to firms, while households are 
mainly viewed as suppliers of funds, rather than as debtors. Yet, recent events show that 
lending to households has taken a central role in the balance sheets of banks and other 
financial intermediaries, as well as in the functioning of financial markets and of the real 
economy. The ongoing sub-prime lending crisis underscores the central importance of the 
household credit market in determining both the stability of the financial system and the level 
of economic activity. While in the pre-crisis period lending to households increased strongly 
in the United States, it grew even more rapidly in other developed countries and several 
emerging economies, where it was the fastest growing segment of total credit (IMF, 2006). 
The crisis shows that understanding the determinants of lending to households and of their 
solvency is of great importance not only to market practitioners, but also for regulators and 
policy makers. 
In the last two decades the household credit buildup in the U.S. has been accompanied 
by rising insolvencies. It is natural to ask whether this correlation is specific to the U.S. recent 
experience or applies to other countries and periods as well. In other words, are highly 
indebted households more “financially fragile”, that is, more likely to default, especially when 
hit by adverse shocks, such as unemployment or interest rates increases? And, if so, does their 
financial fragility vary across countries, as a function of institutional variables such as 
bankruptcy law provisions or judicial efficiency? 
In this paper, we try to get a handle on these issues by drawing on a variety of data and 
sources. First, we rely on cross-country data to study the international determinants of 
household credit. Second, we merge panel data on household arrears for 11 European 
countries with macroeconomic data on lending to households, interest rates, cyclical 
indicators and institutional variables. Finally, we turn to the analysis of longer time series for 
individual countries, to inquire whether the correlation between lending and defaults observed 
in the U.S. is also present elsewhere, and how institutional changes affect household 
insolvencies. 
On the whole, the evidence suggests that insolvencies tend to be associated with greater 
households’ indebtedness, supporting the financial fragility hypothesis. The panel data on 
insolvencies show that European countries that experienced relatively fast debt growth also   8
featured larger increases in insolvency rates. This is confirmed by time series evidence for the 
U.S. and the U.K. 
We also find that institutions are powerful determinants of households’ debt and 
defaults. Cross-country regressions show that the size of the household credit market is 
associated with better judicial enforcement and information sharing arrangements, while 
panel regressions suggest that institutional arrangements affect the sensitivity of insolvencies 
to household debt, as well as their sensitivity to economic shocks. Finally, our time series data 
for the U.S. and Germany indicate that pro-debtor reforms are followed by increases in 
insolvency rates, while the opposite applies to pro-creditor reforms. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the main factors that affect household 
debt and insolvencies, and shape their relationship. Sections 3, 4 and 5 present, respectively, 
the international cross-country analysis, the European panel data estimates and the time series 
analysis for Germany, the U.K. and the U.S. Section 6 summarizes the main findings. 
 
 
2. Determinants of Household Debt and Insolvency 
 
In this section we provide a brief overview of the main factors that may affect the 
indebtedness of households and their default rates: (i) institutional features that shape the 
market’s contracting environment, such as judicial enforcement and information sharing 
arrangements among lenders; (ii) demand-side factors, such as the age structure of the 
population and the degree of income inequality; and (iii) supply-side factors, such as the 
competitive structure of the credit market. The role played by these factors has been 
highlighted in previous research on the international differences in household debt (Jappelli 
and Pagano, 1989, and various essays in Bertola, Disney and Grant, 2006) and saving patterns 
(Banks, Blundell and Smith, 2003; Hurd and Kapteyn, 2003; and Börsch-Supan and Lusardi, 
2003). 
 
2.1. Institutional Factors 
 
The problems arising from informational asymmetries and poor enforcement of 
contracts may hinder the efficient provision of credit to households. The severity of these 
problems depends on the quality of the institutional framework: better institutions may   9
facilitate the collection of credit-relevant information by banks and therefore their screening 
of credit applicants, or may mitigate their recovery costs in case of default, as well as reduce 
the likelihood of default itself. In our analysis, we shall explore the role of institutions in 
shaping the international differences in household lending and defaults. We shall also explore 
whether institutions may affect the financial fragility of households, in the sense of changing 
the sensitivity of default rates to income shocks, as well as their sensitivity to accumulated 
debt. Specifically, we wish to identify the institutional settings that make households more 
willing to repay even in the presence of adverse shocks or when they are highly indebted. 
 
2.1.1. Bankruptcy Regulation and Judicial Enforcement 
 
A borrower is willing to repay debt if the gain from defaulting is lower than the 
perceived cost of the expected sanctions. This does not only depend on the lenders’ 
willingness to inflict such sanctions, but on the entire set of institutional arrangements 
governing the credit market. Bankruptcy law and its enforcement by the judiciary are central 
to these arrangements, and therefore affect the supply of loans. The more efficient the judicial 
system, the greater the supply. 
Historically, countries have developed different legal systems, featuring different 
degrees of protection to creditors. This is documented in La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), who 
find that the breadth of credit markets is correlated with their measure of creditor right 
protection and the origin of the legal system. The most important set of rules determining 
creditor rights is bankruptcy regulation, which determines the assets to be used for repayment 
and their division among creditors. Bankruptcy regulation varies substantially across 
countries. For instance, Italian bankruptcy law does not have formal discharge provisions for 
individuals (as opposed to firms), while in Germany discharge from bankruptcy for 
individuals is possible since 2001, conditional on agreeing to a court-approved repayment 
plan. 
Most of the empirical research on personal bankruptcy relies on the variation in 
exemption levels across different states in the U.S. Gropp, Scholz and White (1997) find that 
households living in states with comparatively high exemptions are more likely to be turned 
down for credit, borrow less, and pay higher interest rates. They interpret this result as 
reflecting the negative effect of debtor-friendly regulation on the supply of loans. This is 
confirmed by White (2006), who finds that debt forgiveness in bankruptcy harms future   10
borrowers by reducing credit availability and raising interest rates.  
The enforcement of creditor rights is no less important than the formal entitlement to 
such rights. International differences in the efficiency and honesty of the judiciary may result 
in different effective degrees of creditor protection. Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer (2003) report that the duration of dispute resolution for two clinical court cases (the 
collection of a bounced check and the eviction of a delinquent tenant) varies substantially 
across countries: for instance, Italy features very long foreclosure mortgage proceedings and 
low judicial efficiency, while the reverse is true in Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon countries. 
Even within the same country, the efficiency of courts can vary a great deal and affect the 
availability of household credit. Using Italian survey data on households and indicators of 
judicial efficiency, Fabbri and Padula (2004) document that judicial enforcement is important 
to the amount of credit extended to households.  
These country-level studies on the institutional determinants of household debt have 
recently been complemented by the cross-country study of Beck, Buyukkarabacak, Rioja and 
Valev (2009), who investigate the determinants and effects of household credit as a share of 
total credit (including enterprise credit) in 45 developed and developing countries. They find 
that countries with better developed institutions and less effective contract enforcement 
feature a larger share of household credit in total credit. Our paper, instead, concerns the 
effect of institutional factors on the size of household credit (rather than on its share in total 
credit) and on households’ default rates, as well as the interaction between the two. 
  
2.1.2. Information Sharing among Lenders 
 
In many countries, lenders routinely share information on the creditworthiness of their 
borrowers, either on a voluntary basis (through credit bureaus) or on a mandatory basis 
(through public credit registers operated by central banks). Information sharing about 
borrowers’ characteristics and their indebtedness can have important effects in household 
credit markets. First, it improves the banks’ knowledge of applicants’ characteristics and 
permits a more accurate prediction of their repayment probabilities. Second, it reduces the 
informational rents that banks could otherwise extract from their customers. Third, it can 
operate as a borrower discipline device. Finally, it reduces borrowers’ incentives to become 
over-indebted by drawing credit simultaneously from several banks without any of them 
realizing.   11
Jappelli and Pagano (2002) show that the extent of credit information sharing differs 
widely across countries: for instance, the number of credit reports is on average 2.3 per capita 
in the United States, 0.6 in the Netherlands, and only 0.05 in Italy. The breadth of credit 
markets is also associated with information sharing: total bank lending to the private sector 
scaled by GNP is indeed larger in countries where information sharing is more solidly 
established and extensive, even after controlling for other economic and institutional 
determinants of bank lending, such as the protection of creditor rights. The more recent study 
by Djankov et al. (2007) confirms that private sector credit relative to GDP is positively 
correlated with information sharing in their recent study of credit market performance and 
institutional arrangements in 129 countries for the period 1978-2003. This conclusion is also 
supported by the firm-level evidence provided by Love and Mylenko (2003) (based on data 
from the 1999 World Business Environment Survey) and Brown, Jappelli and Pagano (2009) 
(based on the EBRD/World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Survey). Finally, the experimental study by Brown and Zehnder (2010) suggests that the 
introduction of information sharing among lenders also affect default rates, by motivating 
borrowers to repay loans, when they would otherwise default. However, so far there is no 
evidence concerning the effects of information sharing mechanisms on the availability of 
credit to households and their propensity to default. 
  
2.2. Demand-Side Factors 
 
According to the life-cycle model, households borrow in anticipation of future income 
growth or to buy expensive indivisible goods such as durables and housing. Typically, this 
situation is predominant among young households. Therefore, in a cross-section of countries 
one should expect countries with higher population growth, and therefore a larger proportion 
of young households, to exhibit a higher ratio of household debt to GDP.  
Households also borrow to smooth transitory income fluctuations. The household credit 
market transfers resources from households in temporary surplus to those in temporary 
deficit. To the extent that income inequality arises from temporary income shocks, one should 
observe a positive correlation between measures of inequality and the size of the household 
credit market. Empirically, of course, a large component of inequality is due to household   12
characteristics or permanent income shocks, so that measures of income inequality (such as 
the Gini index) are at best imperfect proxies for the inequality induced by transitory shocks. 
Another variable that may affect households’ demand for credit is the incentive 
provided by the favorable tax treatment of debt financing. For instance, in many countries the 
tax code gives preferential treatment to mortgages, as part of broader government intervention 
to encourage homeownership. Unfortunately, it is difficult to provide internationally 
comparable measures of tax incentives to household borrowing, due to the complexity of the 
different tax codes: some countries (such as the United States, the Netherlands, and France), 
allow very generous deductions for mortgage interests, while others (e.g. Italy) allows 
mortgage interests deductions for first-time homeowners only (see Poterba, 2002).   
Furthermore, tax legislation varies considerably over time, which makes it even more difficult 
to construct an accurate measure of tax incentives to borrow: for instance, the very generous 
MIRAS (Mortgage Interest Relief at Source) program in the U.K. was phased out in 2000, so 




2.3. Supply-Side Factors 
 
The traditional wisdom in industrial organization is that greater competition between 
banks fosters greater loan availability, cheaper credit and entry by new borrowers. Indeed 
many studies have documented that credit supply increases in the wake of banking 
deregulations, such as the removal of regulatory constraints on multi-state branching in the 
U.S. (see for instance Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006) or the 1985 banking liberalization in 
France (Bertrand, Schoar and Thesmar, 2007). By opening credit access to lower grade 
borrowers, stronger banking competition may also lead to an increase in the average 
insolvency rate: for instance, Dick and Lehnert (2010) show that the increased banking 
competition due to the relaxation of U.S. entry restrictions induced banks to extend more 
                                                 
1 Under MIRAS, a borrower paid the interest less the tax relief, initially equal to the marginal tax rate. Moreover, 
it applied to loans below £30,000 on single mortgagers rather than the property, so married people could each 
receive relief on loans up to £30,000. The MIRAS scheme was criticized as a strongly distortionary measure 
introducing a bias in favor of owner-occupation and in favor of higher income households. Moreover, the relief 
was believed to result in higher house prices, which prevented new homebuyers from gaining fully from it. This 
led to several reductions in the relief rate that culminated with the phasing out of MIRAS in April 2000.   13
credit to existing customers and previously excluded households, and that this credit 
expansion explains at least one tenth of the rise in the U.S. personal bankruptcy rate. 
The literature on relationship lending has pointed to a potentially offsetting effect of an 
increase in banking competition: lending might fall and interest rates may rise if competition 
by outside banks destroys exclusive relationships with pre-existing lenders, thereby 
eliminating the informational advantages stemming from such relationships. Petersen and 
Rajan (1995) were the first to propose a model showing that loan market competition reduces 
lenders’ incentives to invest in relationship building. Creditors are more likely to finance 
credit-constrained firms when credit markets are concentrated because it is easier for them to 
internalize the benefits of assisting the firms. Their study offers evidence from small business 
data in support of this hypothesis: young firms have easier access to credit in more 
concentrated credit markets, a finding that has been only partially confirmed by subsequent 
studies on firm-level data. Here we shall explore whether banking concentration also affects 
lending to households, an issue much less explored in the literature. 
 
 
3. Determinants of Household Debt: Cross-country Analysis 
 
We start our analysis by relating cross-country differences in household debt to 
institutional and macroeconomic variables, relying on international data on household debt. 
Since internationally comparable data on household debt exist for only a small set of 
countries, the construction of such a data set is in itself a useful contribution: the data set is 
reported in Table A1 of the Appendix. The variables used in the estimation refer to 2005 (or 
closest available date) and cover 45 countries.  
Household debt-GDP ratios are constructed merging data from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and European Credit Institute (ECRI) and in many cases are available 
since 2000. We rely on a comprehensive measure of debt that includes mortgage debt, and 
secured and unsecured consumer credit.  In principle secured and unsecured debt may respond 
to different incentives and a different regulatory environment. However in practice the 
distinction between the various forms of household debt is blurred by the fact that to a certain 
extent the two forms of debt are substitutes (households may rely less on consumer credit if 
they are able to borrow more in the mortgage market). Furthermore the distinction between   14
the forms of household debt varies considerably across countries, reflecting different 
definitions and legal arrangements. Finally, the institutional determinants of household debt 
that we consider in the empirical analysis affect both mortgage and consumer credit markets. 
Household debt varies dramatically across countries: it is low in developing countries 
(generally less than 10 percent), intermediate in Eastern Europe (generally between 10 and 20 
percent), and relatively high in developed countries. But even among OECD economies there 
is considerable variation, from the peaks of Denmark, Netherlands, New Zealand, U.S. and 
U.K., to the minimum of Italy and Greece. 
We explore how these large cross-country differences in the magnitude of household 
lending relate to country-level institutional variables. As discussed in Section 2, we view legal 
protection of creditors, judicial efficiency and information sharing among lenders as the most 
promising determinants of the availability of credit. We measure court efficiency by the 
duration of the procedure to collect a bounced check provided by Djankov et al. (2003); other 
measures of court efficiency deliver similar results. As for information sharing among 
lenders, we use the scores available in the World Bank Doing Business database, which are 
based on the percentage of individuals covered by the information sharing system, the type of 
information collected (positive or negative), and the number of years since inception. These 
scores are separately available for private credit bureaus and public credit registers. Since La 
Porta et al. (1998) have shown that investors’ protection differs systematically between civil 
and common law countries, we also control for the legal origin of the country. As a proxy for 
economic development, we use the log of per-capita GDP. As demand-side variables, we 
include the population growth rate and the Gini income inequality index. On the supply side, 
we rely on the concentration ratio as an inverse measure of competition. 
Before presenting regression results, in Table 1 we report sample statistics and 
correlations between these variables. The first column of the correlation matrix shows that 
household debt is positively correlated with GDP, the presence of private and public 
information sharing arrangements and English legal origin, while it is negatively correlated 
with the duration of enforcement procedures and the Gini index. 
[Insert Table 1] 
Figures 1, 2 and 3 plot the ratio of household debt to GDP against, respectively, log per 
capita GDP, duration of enforcement procedures and a summary indicator of the extent of   15
private and public information sharing arrangements. The graphs indicate that household debt 
correlates positively with GDP and information sharing, and is negatively associated with 
duration of enforcement, while highlighting considerable dispersion in the level of household 
debt and in each of the indicators considered. 
[Insert Figures 1, 2 and 3] 
The regression analysis confirms some but not all of the pairwise correlations suggested 
by Figures 1 to 3. All three specifications reported in Table 2 show that institutional variables 
matter: lending to households is positively associated with the presence of information 
sharing arrangements (especially public ones) and negatively correlated with the length of 
judicial procedures. Lending correlates positively with the English legal origin of the country 
(column 2), but the effect of this variable is much attenuated when one controls for 
information sharing and judicial efficiency (column 3). Instead, indebtedness is not 
significantly related to demand or supply-side indicators (the Gini index and the bank 
concentration ratio, respectively), while it is strongly correlated with per capita log GDP in all 
specifications. 
[Insert Table 2] 
To understand the implications of our estimates for the explanation of the determinants 
of household debt, consider the case of Italy, which features a relatively low debt-GDP ratio 
(25 percent) and a relatively high GDP per capita, compared with the sample average 
($20,170). Figure 1 and the regression results indicate that the Italian household credit market 
is relatively underdeveloped: countries with comparable GDP per capita (such as Germany) 
feature debt-GDP ratios in the order of 60 percent. Furthermore, the relatively long 
enforcement Italian procedures (645 days, against a sample average of 263 days) fall short of 
explaining the gap between its debt-GDP ratio and the one predicted by the regression line. 
On the other hand, Figure 3 shows that Italy features relatively well in terms of information 
sharing coverage (both private credit bureaus and public information sharing achieve above-
average values). 
An important issue is whether the large cross-country differences in household debt are 
persistent, or there is “convergence” over time. To shed light on this issue, we plot in Figure 4 
the relation between the debt-GDP ratio in 1999 and the subsequent growth in 2000-05. The   16
figure shows that the relation is negative and highly non-linear: countries with low levels of 
initial debt-GDP ratios (such as the Hungary, the Philippines or Russia) featured annual 
growth rates of this ratio above 5 percentage points. In contrast, in more mature markets (such 
as Germany, Japan, the Netherlands and the United States) the annual growth rate was less 
then 2-percentage points per year. This indicates that convergence is indeed taking place to 
some extent. 
[Insert Figure 4] 
 
4. Determinants of Household Arrears: Panel Data Analysis 
 
The previous section has shown that in cross-country data, the size of the household 
debt market is correlated with institutional characteristics such as the efficiency of judicial 
enforcement and the development of information sharing mechanisms. This raises the 
question of whether the same variables also affect the financial fragility of households, as 
measured by the sensitivity of their default rates to their indebtedness. Analyzing this issue 
with cross-country data is very difficult due to the scarcity of internationally comparable data 
on household default rates. To our knowledge, the only internationally comparable data that 
exist in this area is the self-reported information on payment arrears available in micro 
surveys for several European countries: the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) 
and the EU Survey of Income and Labor Conditions (SILC). The ECHP was collected each 
year between 1994 and 2001, while SILC was collected only in 2004. In both surveys 
households are asked whether they have been unable to make scheduled loan payments 
(separately on mortgage loans and consumer credit) in the last 12 months. We aggregate 
individual responses to this question by countries and years, so as to obtain nationally 
representative and comparable data for 11 EU countries (121 year-country observations).
2 We 
define the fraction of arrears as the ratio between households in arrears and the number of 
indebted households in each country and year. 
[Insert Figure 5] 
                                                 
2 The countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal 
and Spain.   17
As shown by Figure 5, the fraction of arrears varies substantially across countries, 
ranging from values between 2 and 8 percent in Finland to less than 10 percent in Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. In several countries (France, Greece, Ireland, and Austria), 
the fraction of arrears has a U-shaped pattern over time: it falls in the expansionary period of 
the late 1990s and increases in the wake of the 2001 recession. In most countries the time 
series is rather smooth, with a steep increase in consumer credit and mortgage arrears in the 
later part of the sample only for France and Italy. Within individual countries, there is a strong 
correlation between arrears on mortgage and non-mortgage loans, with the exception of 
Belgium in the final part of the sample. We therefore expect them to exhibit a similar 
response to our cyclical and institutional indicators. 
In Table 3 the average fraction of households in arrears is regressed on total household 
debt, unemployment rate and the real lending rate.
3 The estimates in columns 1 to 3 refer to 
arrears in the consumer credit and those in columns 4 to 6 to the mortgage market. Since the 
survey question refers to arrears in the previous 12 months, the explanatory variables are 
lagged by one year. Our hypothesis is that each of these three variables should be associated 
with larger arrear probability: greater indebtedness should make a household more vulnerable 
to adverse income shocks; unemployment captures the frequency of such adverse shocks in 
the population, and the lending rate affects the burden of debt service. The panel nature of the 
data allows us to use fixed effects to control for unobserved differences among countries in 
repayment probabilities. 
[Insert Table 3] 
Column 1 of the table shows that the coefficients of household debt and of the 
unemployment rate are both positive and statistically different from zero at the 1 percent 
level, in line with our hypotheses. In particular, arrears in the consumer credit market increase 
by 0.19 percentage points for each 1-point increase in the unemployment rate, and by 6.4 
points for each 10-point increase in the household debt-GDP ratio. Instead, the coefficient of 
the real interest rate is imprecisely estimated.
4  In column 2 we expand the specification to 
include the log of GDP as a further control for the business cycle, but its coefficient is not 
                                                 
3 See Appendix A for the procedure employed to calculate the real interest rate for each country. 
4 The coefficient of the Herfindhal index in the banking industry (available after 1998) is not statistically 
different from zero either.   18
statistically different from zero In all the specifications, the country fixed effects are jointly 
different from zero at the 1-percent confidence level. 
In column 3 of Table 3 we test whether financial fragility is affected by the institutional 
framework: that is, whether the fraction of arrears is more sensitive to indebtedness and 
unemployment in countries with poor contracting environment and worse enforcement 
systems. We do so by interacting lagged indebtedness and unemployment with the 
institutional variables found to be important in the cross-country regressions for household 
debt in Table 2, that is, information sharing and check collection time.
5 Our hypothesis is that, 
insofar as a better contracting environment or enforcement system raises the perceived cost of 
default, the same increase in unemployment and/or household indebtedness should be 
associated with a smaller increase in our proxy for the default rate. Since these institutional 
variables are time-invariant, their effect is absorbed by the fixed effects. 
The results suggest that the sensitivity of the frequency of arrears to unemployment is 
lower in countries with better information sharing arrangements, as measured by the 
proportion of the population covered by private credit bureaus or public credit registers. The 
coefficient of the interaction between the unemployment rate and information sharing is 
negative (0.175) and statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level, implying that the 
effect of unemployment on consumer credit arrears is larger in countries with less developed 
information sharing. For instance, an increase in the unemployment rate of 1 percentage point 
is associated with an increase in arrears that is 0.7 percentage points larger in countries where 
information sharing covers 40 percent of the population (as in Austria) than in countries 
where information sharing covers 70 to 80 percent (as in the Netherlands or Italy). The 
coefficient of the interaction term between debt and information sharing is also negative 
(0.172), and statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level. To illustrate, a 10 
percentage point increase in the household debt-GDP ratio is associated with an increase in 
arrears that is 0.6 percentage points larger in countries where information sharing covers 40 
percent of the population than in countries where information sharing covers 70 to 80 percent 
(as in the Netherlands or Italy). 
The interaction effect of the time to collect check and unemployment is positive (0.072) 
and significant. That is, a 1-point increase in unemployment rate is associated with an 
                                                 
5 Since these variables are time-invariant, their levels are not entered separately in the specification, because 
their coefficients are absorbed by the country fixed effects.   19
increase in arrears that is 0.2 percentage points larger in countries where duration is 180 days 
(as in France) than where duration is 680 days (as in Italy). The interaction between 
household debt and time to collect checks, instead, is not statistically different from zero. 
Finally, the interaction between debt and unemployment has a positive and precisely 
estimated coefficient. This finding may be interpreted as a symptom that for highly indebted 
households, becoming unemployed tends to reduce the probability of repayment. In the 
aggregate, this is associated with an increased fraction of borrowers in arrears. 
Columns 4 to 6 of Table 3 repeat the estimation for households’ arrears regarding 
mortgage loans. In the specification shown in column 4, the unemployment coefficient is 
positive and precisely estimated, while the debt coefficient is not. The estimates in column 6 
confirm that unemployment has a larger effect in countries with less information sharing, and 
relatively longer check collection.  
Overall, these results support the hypothesis that the financial fragility of households is 
affected both by the level of indebtedness itself and by institutional variables: while greater 
indebtedness is associated with a stronger response of arrears to adverse shocks, information 




5. Determinants of Household Defaults in the U.K., Germany and the U.S. 
 
The time series behavior of household default rates within individual countries can 
usefully complement the evidence described so far, for three distinct reasons. First, time series 
data for the same country are immune from the problem of international data comparability.  
Second, they enable us to get evidence on the changes in indebtedness and insolvencies after 
major bankruptcy law reforms, such as the 1978 reform of the U.S. Personal Bankruptcy 
code, and the 2000 reform of German bankruptcy procedures. Third, they can throw light on 
the dynamic interactions between household indebtedness, insolvencies and macroeconomic 
variables such as the unemployment rate and the real interest rate. However, extended time 
series for household debt and defaults exist only for very few countries.  
In this section, we focus on the U.K., Germany and the U.S. The insolvency rate is 
defined as the ratio of borrowers in default and the total number of borrowers. For the U.S., 
we estimate the number of borrowers from the 1983-2007 Survey of Consumer Finances   20
(interpolating values between survey years). For the U.K. and Germany, we could not find 
comparable data, so that insolvencies are scaled by the total population. 
 
 
5.1. Descriptive analysis 
 
The U.S. offers a valuable source of evidence to study how institutional changes affect 
household propensity to default and its relationship with indebtedness. In the past three 
decades, there have been two such changes: a pro-debtor reform in 1978, which simplified 
consumers’ bankruptcy procedures, followed by a significant increase of individual 
insolvencies; and a pro-creditor reform (the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act) in 2005, whereby Congress cracked down on individuals who filed for 
bankruptcy so as to avoid debt repayment. More specifically, the 2005 reform abolished 
consumers’ right to choose between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, and raised the cost of filing to 
$2,500-$3,500.
6  
As shown in Figure 6, since 1980 there have been remarkable changes in the number of 
personal bankruptcy filings. After the 1978 pro-debtor reform, there has been a large trend 
increase in both the bankruptcy rate and the household debt-GDP ratio, while after the 2005 
pro-creditor reform bankruptcies plummeted from about 2 million to 600,000 in a single year, 
back to the same level prevailing in mid-1980s. Various factors beside bankruptcy regulation 
may have contributed to the rise in defaults between 1980 and 2005: the decline in the social 
stigma associated with bankruptcy, the increase in the supply of mortgage credit and the 
decline in banks’ lending standards. The literature has not reached a consensus on the relative 
importance of each of these factors in the change in U.S. households’ default rates.
7 
                                                 
6 As explained by Li, White and Zhu (2010), in the U.S. filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 entitles individual 
to obtain most unsecured debts to be discharged, and their future earnings to be entirely exempt. If instead an 
individual files under Chapter 13, debtors’ assets are completely exempt, but some of the individual’s future 
earnings must be used to repay debt. Until the 2005 reform, debtors could choose between the two procedures 
and, since most debtors have few non-exempt assets, most borrowers preferred Chapter 7. The 2005 bankruptcy 
reform forced debtors with relatively high income to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 and repay more with 
the subsequent earnings. Li, White and Zhu (2010) show that one unintended consequence of the 2005 reform 
was to induce an increase in the number of insolvencies that did not lead to subsequent bankruptcy filings. 
7 Gross and Souleles (2002) attribute the increase in defaults to an increase in borrowers' willingness to default 
due to declines in the social, informational and legal costs rather than to a deterioration in the risk composition of 
the pool of borrowers. More recent studies instead point to explanations based on the lending policies of banks. 
Mian and Sufi (2009) identify shifts in the supply of mortgage credit by exploiting within-county variation 
across zip codes that differed in latent demand for mortgages in the mid 1990s. Their estimates show that a rapid 
expansion in the supply of mortgage loans driven by disintermediation is a main culprit for the sharp rise in U.S. 
mortgage defaults. Related research by Dell’Ariccia, Deniz and Laeven (2008) documents that the relation   21
[Insert Figure 6] 
Figure 7 shows that also in the U.K. per capita insolvencies increased significantly over 
the last three decades, first peaking in 1993 and then rising steeply after 2001: while only 5 
households in 10,000 defaulted in 2001, five years later 18 did. The increased insolvency rate 
of the early 1990s was associated with an increase in the unemployment rate.
8 The recent 
buildup in household credit and insolvencies was associated with falling interest rates: the real 
lending rate declined from 4.3 percent in the third quarter of 1997 to 1.85 percent in the third 
quarter of 2005. A possible interpretation is that the low interest rates of this decade 
contributed to the debt buildup, and thereby raised subsequent insolvencies – thus 
contributing to British households’ financial fragility. 
[Insert Figure 7] 
As in the U.S., the evidence from Germany underscores the effects of changes in 
bankruptcy law on household insolvencies.  Indeed, in 2001 the Bundestag introduced a new 
Bankruptcy Law that lowered the cost of filing for bankruptcy, which increased dramatically 
the incentives to default. The annual compound growth rate of consumer insolvencies 
between 2001 and 2005 exceeded 40 percent, and 161,430 individual insolvencies were 
reported in 2006, corresponding to 1.7 households per thousand, an eightfold increase 
compared to 2000, as show in Figure 8. This is unlikely to be due to worsening economic 
conditions, since in the same period business insolvencies declined. According to Zywicki 
(2005), after the reform German consumers “increasingly appear to be choosing to file for 
bankruptcy as a response to financial distress, rather than reducing spending or tapping 
savings to avoid bankruptcy” (p. 2). 
[Insert Figure 8] 
Before the reform, the increase in the household debt-GDP ratio was accompanied by a 
slight increase in insolvencies. In contrast, after the reform the household debt decreases 
                                                                                                                                                          
between the recent boom and current delinquencies in the U.S. subprime mortgage can be explained by a 
decrease in lending standards that is unrelated to improvements in underlying economic fundamentals. Dick and 
Lehnert (2010) find that the increased competitive pressure following banking deregulation induced banks to 
expand lending to riskier borrowers. 
8 See Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006) for an analysis of mortgage credit liberalization in the UK. 
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considerably, possibly reflecting a reduced willingness by banks to offer loans to households 
that – in the new legal regime – are expected to be less likely to repay. 
 
5.2. Time series analysis 
 
The time series for the U.S. and the U.K. are long enough to lend themselves to the 
estimation of vector autoregressions (VAR), to investigate the dynamic relationships between 
debt, insolvencies and macroeconomic variables via Granger causality tests and impulse 
response functions. The Appendix describes the variables used in the estimation for each 
country.  
To investigate the effect of households’ indebtedness on insolvencies, we estimate a 
VAR with four variables: the insolvency rate, the unemployment rate, the real interest rate, 
the household debt-GDP ratio and a time trend. The model includes two lags for each of these 
variables and is estimated for the 1987-2008 sample period in the U.K. and the 1980-2005 for 
the U.S.
9  
The Granger causality tests shown in Table 4 reveal one-way causality between debt and 
insolvencies, as well as between unemployment and insolvencies in both countries: changes 
in unemployment and household debt are associated with subsequent changes in insolvencies, 
while the opposite is not true. 
[Insert Table 4] 
Figure 9 plots the impulse response function of insolvencies to an increase in 
indebtedness in the U.S. The response function shows that an increase in household debt is 
followed by greater insolvencies, with the effect becoming statistically significant two to four 
years later. The results for the U.K. displayed in Figure 10 are qualitatively similar. The 
impulse response function shows that an increase in household debt is followed by a larger 
insolvency rate, with the response becoming statistically significant in the second year.
10  
[Insert Figures 9 and 10] 
                                                 
9 The choice of the number of lags was mainly due to the availability of data. However, to check for robustness 
we used also one and three-lags specifications. 
10 For both countries, the confidence bounds of the responses to the unemployment and interest rates are large, 
preventing reliable inference, and are not reported.    23
 Altogether, the time series evidence suggests two main conclusions. First, defaults 
increase after periods of rapid debt accumulation, which can be interpreted as support for the 
financial fragility hypothesis.  Secondly, pro-debtor bankruptcy reforms tend to be associated 
with a subsequent increase in insolvencies, while the opposite applies to pro-creditor reforms, 





Household debt and insolvencies are increasingly central to the working of the 
economic system and the concerns of policy makers. In particular, a key issue is to understand 
the drivers of households’ propensity to default and how it changes when credit access 
expands and the legal environment changes. In this paper we make an effort to pool different 
datasets and sources to investigate two related issues: (i) whether insolvencies tend to increase 
and become more sensitive to adverse shocks when households are heavily indebted – which 
we label the financial fragility hypothesis; (ii) whether the relation between insolvencies and 
debt is affected by the quality of institutions, and specifically by judicial enforcement and 
information sharing arrangements between lenders. 
The evidence suggests that insolvencies tend to be associated with greater households’ 
indebtedness, consistently with the financial fragility hypothesis: our panel analysis of 
insolvencies shows that European countries that experienced relatively fast debt growth, also 
featured larger increases in insolvency rates. The VAR analysis for the U.K. and the U.S. 
confirms that insolvencies increase in the wake of large household debt accumulation.  
We also find that institutions are powerful determinants of household debt and defaults. 
The cross-country estimates show that debt is associated with better judicial enforcement and 
information sharing arrangements. The panel regressions for European countries suggest that 
contract enforcement and information sharing arrangements reduce the sensitivity of 
insolvencies to household debt, as well as their sensitivity to economic shocks, such as 
increases in unemployment. Finally, the importance of credit market regulation is borne out 
by the time series evidence for the U.S. and Germany, where pro-debtor reforms (such as the 
1983 U.S. and the 2001 German reforms) are followed by increases in insolvencies, while 
pro-creditor reforms (such as the 2005 U.S. reform) are followed by the opposite outcome.   24
Even though our data stop short of the sub-prime loan crisis period, our findings help 
explaining a key feature of the crisis, namely that even moderate shocks can precipitate a 
large wave of household defaults, in a situation where households are already heavily 
indebted. Our evidence also suggests that the financial fragility of households can be 
mitigated by the design of institutions that reduce the propensity to default, such as 
improvements in judicial efficiency, bankruptcy regulation and information sharing 
arrangements. 
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Appendix. Definition of variables and data sources 
 
 
A1. Cross-country data 
 
Debt-GDP ratio. Total household debt (sum of mortgage debt, secured and unsecured consumer 
credit) as percentage of GDP in 2005. Sources: IMF (2006) and ECRI (2007 Edition, Table 1c). We 
replace ECRI variables with IMF variables when ECRI data is missing.  
 
Time to collect check. Djankov et al. (2003), database for the paper Courts: The Lex Mundi Project. 
 
Log Per capita GDP. Definition: log of per capita GDP in thousands of U.S. dollars in 2000. Djankov 
et al. (2003), database for the paper Courts: The Lex Mundi Project.  
 
Information sharing indicators. The two variables measure the percentage of the population covered 
by private credit bureaus and public credit registers. A public registry is defined as a database owned 
by public authorities that collects information on the standing of borrowers in the financial system and 
makes it available to financial institutions. A private bureau is defined as a private commercial firm or 
non-profit organization that maintains a database on the standing of borrowers in the financial system, 
and its primary role is to facilitate exchange of information amongst banks and financial institutions. 
The variables refer to 2003. Source: World Bank, Doing Business Project. 
 
Gini index. The index is an updated version of the data described in Deininger and Squire (1996). 
They collected 682 observations for 108 countries, of which 65 percent are based on national statistics 
agencies or compilations by international agencies and for the remaining 35 percent are based on 
primary sources such as household surveys. 
 
Concentration ratio. The index drawn from the database by Levine and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006 
edition. It equals the share of assets of the three largest banks in total banking system assets. It is 
defined using the Bankscope database compiled by Fitch-IBCA, which reports bank balance sheet data 
since 1988. 
 
Population growth rate: Average Population growth in 2000-2005. Source: Earth-trends,  
http://earthtrends.wri.org/searchable_db/index.php?theme=4 
 
Legal origin. Identifies the legal origin of the company law or commercial code of each country. 
Source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
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A2. Panel data 
 
Percentage of the population in arrears. The variable is based on replies to the following questions 
contained in the ECHP (1996-2001) and in the SILC (2004): 
 
  “Has the household been unable to make scheduled mortgage payments during the past 12 
months?” 
  “Has the household been unable to pay hire purchase installments or other loan repayments 
during the past 12 months?” 
 
The variables are aggregated by country and year using sample weights. Data non available for 2002 
and 2003 are interpolated. 
 
Real interest rate. In all countries, this is defined as the nominal lending rate less the inflation rate. 
We have considered the long term interest rate, defined as the rate on 10-years government bonds, less 
the consumer price index. Source: OECD. 
 
Debt-GDP ratio. For each country, we considered data on loans to households from national Central 
Banks, OECD and ECB defining the debt-GDP ratio with data on GDP from OECD. Then, we 
compared the values obtained with those available from ECRI and IMF, keeping only the most similar 
series. 
 
Unemployment rate. Standardized rate of unemployment. Source: OECD. 
 
Information sharing. Defined as the percentage of the population covered by private credit bureaus 
or public credit registers. A public registry is defined as a database owned by public authorities that 
collects information on the standing of borrowers in the financial system and makes it available to 
financial institutions. A private bureau is defined as a private commercial firm or non-profit 
organization that maintains a database on the standing of borrowers in the financial system, and its 
primary role is to facilitate exchange of information amongst banks and financial institutions. The 
variables refer to 2003. Source: World Bank, Doing Business Project. 
 
Time to collect check. Djankov et al (2003), database for the paper Courts: The Lex Mundi Project.  
 
 
A3. Individual country time series 
 
Individual insolvencies. For the U.K., the statistics refer to total quarterly insolvent individuals in 
England and Wales,  are derived from administrative records of the Department for Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR). For comparability with the other countries, quarterly data 
are annualized. Source: The Insolvency Institute (http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/). For Germany, 
monthly insolvency registrations are aggregated on a quarterly basis and annualized for comparability 
with the other countries. Source: DESTATIS (http://www.destatis.de). In the United States, individual 
insolvencies are annual data. Source: American Bankruptcy Institute (http://www.abiworld.org). 
 
Real interest rate. For the U.K. the lending rate refers to quarterly data about nominal zero coupon 
yields on ten years government bonds since 1982. Source: National Statistics 
(http://www.statistics.gov.uk/). For Germany, monthly interest rates for loans for house purchase are 
aggregated on a quarterly basis from 1975 to 2002. In 2003 this series has been discontinued and the 
Bundesbank provides a different series, which covers 2003-2007. Since there may be some 
inconsistencies between the two series, we have also linearly interpolated the former series to cover 
the years 2003-2007. Source: Bundesbank (http://www.bundesbank.de/). In the United States, the   30
statistics refer to the interest rate on ten years government bonds. Source: The Federal Reserve 
(http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/). For all three countries, we have considered the Consumer 
Price Index provided by the main price indexes section of the OECD Department of Statistics, in order 
to obtain the real lending rates. 
 
Unemployment rate. For the U.K., the statistics refer to total unemployment rate over the period 
1971-2007. Source: National Statistics (http://www.statistics.gov.uk/). For Germany, we have 
collected quarterly data since 1992. Source: Bundesbank (http://www.bundesbank.de/). We have 
considered yearly data about unemployment rate in the United States. Source: OECD 
(http://www.oecd.org/statistics/). 
 
Household debt/GDP ratio. We consider data about total financial liabilities of households in all 
three countries. For the U.K., the data about household debt and Gross Domestic Product are 
published by the National Statistics (http://www.statistics.gov.uk/). For the Germany, the source for 
both series is the Bundesbank. In the United States, we have collected the data about household debt 
provided by the Federal Reserve, while the GDP is published by the OECD. Then, we have calculated 
the ratio and we have compared our data with other series available at ECRI and Hypostat, in order to 
confirm that we got consistent measure of household debt. 
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Table 1 
Sample statistics and correlation matrix of the variables used 




















               
Mean 0.33  11881  263.00  0.64  0.35  0.39  0.08  0.20 
Standard deviation  0.27  11084  209.23  0.19  0.09  0.37  0.16  0.41 
Minimum 0.02  440  39.00  0.26  0.24  0.00  0.00  0.00 





















            
Debt-GDP  1.0000           
Log  GDP  0.7662  1.0000         
Log  duration  -0.5623  -0.1855  1.0000        
Concentration  ratio  0.1905  0.2169  -0.0260  1.0000      
Gini  index  -0.3717  -0.3993  0.1051  -0.3073  1.0000     
Priv. credit bureau  0.5189  0.5304  -0.2542  -0.1593  -0.0020  1.0000     
Pub. credit register  0.0385  0.0991  0.0805  0.3004  0.1767  -0.2616  1.0000   
English  origin  0.3837  0.0966  -0.3720  -0.2551  -0.0080 0.4387 -0.2303 1.0000 
   32
 
Table 2 






Log of per capita GNP in 1999  0.153***  0.140***  0.108*** 
 (0.028)  (0.018)  (0.023) 
Population growth  0.033  0.019  0.009 
 (0.046)  (0.031)  (0.028) 
Gini coefficient  0.118  0.181  0.355 
 (0.469)  (0.307)  (0.316) 
Banks’ concentration rate  0.097  0.243*  0.116 
 (0.180)  (0.122)  (0.122) 
English origin    0.339***  0.160** 
   (0.058)  (0.062) 
Log duration of check collection      0.125*** 
     (0.027) 
Private registry coverage      0.150* 
     (0.074) 
Public registry coverage      0.466*** 
     (0.134) 
Constant  1.078***  1.206***  0.023 
 (0.377)  (0.247)  (0.320) 
      
Observations 45  45  39 
R-squared 0.49  0.74  0.87 
 
Note. The dependent variable is the household debt-GDP ratio. One asterisk denotes significance at 
the 10 percent level; two asterisks at the 5 percent; three asterisks at the 10 percent. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parenthesis. 
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Table 3 
Determinants of the fraction of household arrears 




  Consumer credit  Mortgage loans 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
Unemployment rate  0.192***  0.261**  -0.834*  0.186  0.298*  -1.21*** 
  (0.055) (0.114) (0.413) (0.109) (0.137) (0.192) 
Real interest rate  0.005  0.018  -0.028  -0.011  0.009  -0.072 
  (0.048) (0.046) (0.049) (0.050) (0.045) (0.054) 
Debt-GDP  ratio  0.064** 0.059* 0.086**  0.049  0.040  -0.053 
  (0.029) (0.028) (0.033) (0.030) (0.031) (0.038) 
Log  GDP   0.017    0.028  
   (0.026)    (0.026)  
Debt-GDP × information sharing      -0.172**      -0.036 
     (0.061)     (0.062) 
Debt-GDP × time to collect checks     -0.007     -0.008 
     (0.008)     (0.006) 
Debt-GDP × unemployment      1.975*      2.567*** 
     (0.957)     (0.441) 
Unempl. × information sharing      -0.175*      -0.365** 
     (0.080)     (0.120) 
Unempl. × time to collect checks      0.072***      0.128*** 
     (0.020)     (0.027) 
Constant  -0.025 -0.244 0.014 -0.011 -0.366  0.050*** 
  (0.016) (0.333) (0.021) (0.020) (0.335) (0.012) 
        
Observations  121 121 116 121 121 116 
R-squared  0.66 0.66 0.76 0.69 0.70 0.83 
 
 
Note. In columns (1)-(3) the dependent variable is the fraction of households in each year and country 
reporting to have been unable to pay hire purchase installments or other loan repayments during the 
past 12 months. In columns (4)-(6) the dependent variable is the fraction of households in each year 
and country reporting to have been unable to make scheduled mortgage payments during the past 12 
months. All variables are lagged one period. One asterisk denotes significance at the 10 percent level; 
two asterisks at the 5 percent; three asterisks at the 10 percent. Standard errors adjusted for clustering 
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Table 4 
Granger causality tests 
 
The table reports the p-value of the Granger causality test from a 2-lag VAR whose variables are the 
insolvency rate, the household debt/GDP ratio, the unemployment rate and the real interest rate. The 
null hypothesis is that the variable in each row does not Granger-cause the variable indicated on top of 
the column. For the U.S. the period of estimation is 1980-2005; for the U.K. it is 1983-2008. 
 
United States  Insolvencies  Debt-GDP  Unemployment  Real interest rate 
Insolvencies -.-  0.476  0.328  0.003 
Debt-GDP 0.000  -.-  0.325  0.000 
Unemployment 0.004  0.051  -.- 0.000 
Real interest rate  0.082  0.222  0.402  -.- 
        
United Kingdom        
Insolvencies -.-  0.303  0.552  0.903 
Debt-GDP 0.000  -.-  0.583  0.655 
Unemployment 0.035  0.006  -.- 0.019 
Real interest rate  0.062  0.653  0.456  -.- 
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Table A1 

















                
Argentina 0.05  7550  300.00  0.41  0.51  1.00  0.25  0.00 
Australia 0.63  20950  319.50  0.63  0.32  1.00  0.00  1.00 
Austria 0.37  25429  434.00  0.71  0.28  0.40  0.01  0.00 
Belgium 0.35  24649  120.00  0.86  0.26  0.00  0.56  0.00 
Brazil 0.04  4350  180.00  0.43  0.59  0.43  0.09  0.00 
Bulgaria 0.12  1410  410.00  0.64  0.28  .  0.21  0.00 
Chile 0.20  4630  200.00  0.55  0.51  0.19  0.31  0.00 
China 0.12  780  180.00  0.77  0.45  0.00  0.10  0.00 
Colombia 0.08  2170  527.00  0.40  0.54  0.28  0.00  0.00 
Cyprus 0.59  11950  360.00  0.89  .  .  .  1.00 
Czech Republic  0.12  5020  270.00 0.69  0.25  0.51 0.04 0.00 
Denmark 1.01  32049  83.00  0.79  0.27  0.12  0.00  0.00 
Estonia 0.21  3400  305.00  0.98  0.32  0.18  0.00  0.00 
Finland 0.40  24729  240.00  0.99  0.25  0.15  0.00  0.00 
France 0.39  24790  181.00  0.56  0.31  0.00  0.12  0.00 
Germany 0.64  25620  154.00  0.66  0.28  0.94  0.00  0.00 
Greece 0.31  12110  315.00  0.82 0.36  0.38 0.00 0.00 
Hungary 0.15  4640  365.00  0.63  0.24  0.06  0.00  0.00 
India 0.08  440  106.00  0.37  0.33  0.06  0.00  1.00 
Indonesia 0.07  600  225.00  0.61  0.34  0.00  0.08  0.00 
Ireland 0.61  21470  130.00  0.64  0.31  1.00  0.00  1.00 
Italy 0.25  20170  645.00  0.42  0.31  0.68  0.07  0.00 
Japan 0.45  32030  60.00  0.46  0.25  .  0.00  0.00 
Korea 0.61  8490  75.00  0.49  0.32  0.77  0.00  0.00 
Latvia 0.18  2430  188.50  0.54  0.34  0.00  0.02  0.00 
Lithuania 0.08  2640  150.00  0.86  0.29  0.07  0.04  0.00 
Luxembourg 0.43  42930  210.00 0.26  0.29  . .  0.00 
Malaysia 0.53  3390  90.00  0.47  0.49  .  0.42  1.00 
Malta 0.39  9210  545.00  0.89  .  .  .  0.00 
Mexico 0.12  4440  283.00  0.68  0.49  0.69  0.00  0.00 
Netherlands 0.77  25140  39.00 0.75  0.29  0.69  0.00  0.00 
New Zealand  0.77  13990  60.00  0.79  0.37  1.00  0.00  1.00 
Peru 0.05  2130  441.00  0.73  0.48  0.29  0.19  0.00 
Philippines 0.04  1050  164.00  0.62  0.46  0.05  0.00  0.00 
Poland 0.12  4070  1000.00  0.54  0.31  0.38  0.00  0.00 
Portugal 0.64  11030  420.00  0.90  0.39  0.09  0.72  0.00 
Romania 0.05  1470  225.00  0.83  0.28  0.05  0.03  0.00 
Russia 0.03  2250  160.00  0.38  0.32  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Slovak Republic  0.10  4491  .  0.71  0.26  0.45  0.01  0.00 
Slovenia 0.12  9999  1003.00  0.64  0.28  0.00  0.03  0.00 
South Africa  0.38  3170  84.00  0.92  .  0.53  0.00  1.00 
Spain 0.57  14800  147.00  0.86  0.35  0.07  0.45  0.00 
Sweden 0.55  26750  190.00  0.98  0.25  1.00  0.00  0.00 
Taiwan 0.54  13310  210.00  0.31  0.24  0.60  0.00  0.00 
Thailand 0.24  2010  210.00  0.53  0.40  0.22  0.00  1.00 
Turkey 0.06  2900  105.00  0.66  0.37  .  0.07  0.00 
United Kingdom  0.75  23590  101.00  0.47  0.34  0.86  0.00  1.00 
United States  0.85  31910  54.00  0.30  0.38  1.00  0.00  1.00 
Venezuela 0.02  3680  360.00  0.52  0.42  0.00  0.00  0.00 
                
Total 0.33  11881.88  263.00  0.64  0.35  0.39  0.08  0.20   36
 
Figure 1 





























































































































































Log Duration of Check Collection
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Figure 3 
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Figure 5 
Fraction of household arrears in selected EU countries 
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Figure 6 
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Figure 8 




























































































Impulse response functions from VAR estimates for the U.S.  
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Figure 10 
Impulse response functions from VAR estimates for the U.K.  
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